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We examine the link between corporations and community by showing how corporate density interacts with thelocal social and cultural infrastructure to affect the growth and decline of the number of local nonprofits between
1987 and 2002. We focus on two subpopulations of nonprofits in 100 American cities: (1) elite-oriented cultural and
educational institutions and (2) social welfare-oriented organizations. We find that corporate density enhances the growth
of both types of nonprofits, as does location in the northeast United States and a long-established business community,
but corporate density is especially potent for the growth of elite-oriented nonprofits—but not social welfare nonprofits—
when local networks and cultural norms support elite mobilization. We conclude that despite globalizing trends, the local
geographic community continues to be an important unit of analysis for unpacking multisector organizational processes
among corporations and nonprofits.
Key words : institutional theory; social responsibility; interorganizational relations; nonprofit organizations
History : Published online in Articles in Advance December 22, 2011.
Introduction
The benefit of the corporation to society has been
debated extensively over the past century (Margolis and
Walsh 2003, Avi-Yonah 2005). Some view the corpora-
tion as an intrinsically social institution with the poten-
tial for broad public benefit (e.g., Dodd 1932, Kaysen
1957, Elkington 1998), whereas others see the corpora-
tion as a device prone to promoting self-serving behav-
ior and narrow interests (e.g., Berle 1931, Jensen 2002).
Over the past 30 years, this debate has focused on the
perspective of the corporation and, in particular, on the
extent to which corporate social action profits the cor-
poration itself, rather than its supposed societal benefi-
ciaries (Margolis and Walsh 2003). This narrowing of
focus can be seen as part of a broader trend in orga-
nizational theory. Whereas the effect of corporations on
society was a central concern for early organizational
theorists (e.g., Michels 1962, Weber 1964), it has largely
been ignored as of late (Hinings and Greenwood 2002,
Stern and Barley 1996). Seeking to reverse this trend, we
address the issue of who benefits from the existence of
corporations. We do so by examining how corporations
influence the vibrancy of their local nonprofit sector, dif-
ferentiating the effects on those nonprofits that address
broader social welfare interests from those that dispro-
portionally benefit the elite.
Our approach to this issue focuses on two interrelated
questions: How does the community-level institutional
infrastructure exert pressures on organizations that affect
the vitality of local nonprofit sectors? And, more specif-
ically, how do elite interests and the social organization
of the local elite influence the link between the corpo-
rate and nonprofit sectors? We focus on local nonprofit
sectors because they are vital to the civic health of com-
munities and provide social services, education, medical
care, and cultural enrichment that are beyond the reach
of the market (Powell and Steinberg 2006). Local non-
profits are thus a site where the interests and needs of
a community intersect in “a particular combination of
ideological, political, social, and economic conditions”
(Hall 1987, p. 3). Our general aim is to unpack variation
at the community level to better understand the inter-
play between corporate engagement and local nonprof-
its, addressing the question of why nonprofits in some
communities thrive, as in the Twin Cities (Galaskiewicz
1985, 1991, 1997), while those in other communities,
equally endowed with major corporations, do not (e.g.,
Detroit).
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We examine how the social and cultural infrastructure
of local corporate sectors shape the growth and decline
of nonprofits in 100 American communities. Examining
variation across local organizational populations across
a large number of communities over time enables us to
identify those institutional features of a community that
make it more or less fertile for the maintenance and
growth of nonprofits (Marquis et al. 2007). Building on
Warren’s (1967) foundational research on interorganiza-
tional communities as well as work on community elites
(e.g., Hunter 1953, Kono et al. 1998) and the commu-
nity ecology of organizations (e.g., Freeman and Audia
2006), we conceptualize the geographic community as
an institutional field—that is, a more or less integrated
set of corporate, nonprofit, and governmental actors that
“partake of a common meaning system and 0 0 0 interact
more frequently and fatefully with one another than with
actors outside the field” (Scott 2001, p. 84). In so doing,
we overcome a weakness of prior work on institutional
fields in focusing on specific industries with limited gen-
eralizability (Davis 2010) and return attention to the
comparative institutional perspective envisioned in early
work on neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell
1983). Although the preponderance of recent research
has focused on geographically independent fields (Scott
2001), there is increasing recognition that such a per-
spective misses important reasons why corporations and
nonprofits maintain their local focus even in a global
age (Marquis and Battilana 2009, Marquis et al. 2011).
We seek to address this oversight.
Prior research on the growth and decline of local non-
profit sectors has emphasized the role of factors such
as needs of residents (Weisbrod 1998), governmental
outsourcing (Salamon 1987), and the demographic and
social changes that induce individuals toward “bowl-
ing alone” rather than engaging in nonprofit voluntarism
(Putnam 2000). However, there is also evidence that
the decisions of those controlling the means and ends
of large organizations—the corporate elite—weigh heav-
ily in shaping the nonprofit sector of local communi-
ties (see, e.g., Galaskiewicz 1997 on Minneapolis–St.
Paul). Local nonprofit sectors are diverse, serving a
range of community interests from social welfare needs
such as homelessness, civil rights, mental illness, unem-
ployment, illiteracy, and food security to providing “lux-
ury goods” (Heilbrun and Gray 2001, p. 16) in the arts,
culture, and private education. By treating the nonprofit
sector as a relatively undifferentiated field, much prior
work overlooks how different kinds of dynamics may
animate the relations between businesses and social wel-
fare organizations, on the one hand, and businesses and
elite high-status cultural and educational institutions, on
the other.
We reason that such systematic differences may be
related to elite interests in, and support of, different
types of nonprofit organizations. Odendahl (1990), for
instance, demonstrated that the charitable wealthy fund
nonprofits in ways that promote the needs of their class:
“The wealthy fund institutions of higher learning, art,
or music primarily, rather than basic human services not
provided by the state, such as for the homeless” (Nader
1991, p. 483). The class Mills (1956) labeled the “corpo-
rate rich” has long since replaced the “old money rich”
as the most critical source of support for high-status
cultural and educational institutions, and longstanding
sociological research has shown that these high-status
organizations function in part to promote local elite
cohesion (DiMaggio 1986, Useem 1988). Extending this
line of reasoning, we hypothesize that the growth of
local elite-oriented nonprofits will be greater when cor-
porations are in communities characterized by dense
social and cultural infrastructures that promote elite
cohesion and interests. That is, in some communities,
the elite will be effectively “golfing alone,” without a
supportive social and cultural infrastructure to organize
efforts, while in others these external environmental fac-
tors will enable more coordinated corporate action.
To test these ideas, we assembled community-level
data from the census for every major American urban
area;1 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) records on several
thousand nonprofits; and securities filings for every cor-
poration listed on NASDAQ and the New York Stock
Exchange to examine changes at the community level in
1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002.2 Our time period is theo-
retically significant, as the governmental stance toward
nonprofits changed as a result of the 1986 Reagan tax
reforms, which led to a period of unusual growth in
this sector (Abzug and Simonoff 2004, Salamon 1987).
Such a period of change is ideal for investigating our
research questions. In addition, many of the corporate,
social, and cultural factors we study varied substantially
within and across American cities in this same period.
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the two largest merger
waves in U.S. history: nearly one in three Fortune 500
manufacturers were acquired in the 1980s, as conglom-
erates were divided and sold or spun off (Davis et al.
1994). Subsequently, an even larger merger wave and a
spate of corporate relocations in the 1990s rearranged
the geography of corporate headquarters.
Foreshadowing our results, we find support for our
core premise: although a dense corporate sector was
associated with growth across all types of nonprofits,
having a locally cohesive elite and a supportive local cul-
ture was particularly effective at spurring the growth of
elite-oriented nonprofits. Thus, our work reinforces the
integrity of the local community as a field of study for
organizational behavior and contributes to understand-
ing the institutional processes underlying the growth of
nonprofits in the United States.
Nonprofit Sectors in U.S. Communities
The nonprofit sector sits at the intersection between
the state and the market (Frumkin 2002) and is large
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and complex, consisting of nearly one million nonprofit
organizations, ranging from art museums and universi-
ties to soup kitchens and women’s shelters. What unites
these diverse organizations is their tax-exempt status
under section 501(c)(3) of the IRS code. Their funding
is based primarily on donative or membership sources,
which can come from corporations, individuals, govern-
ment, or other nonprofits. As of 2002 (the end of our
time period), roughly 200,000 nonprofit organizations
employed 8.8 million persons, or 8.2% of the private
labor force, which is “nearly three times as many work-
ers as the country’s entire agriculture sector, twice as
many workers as the country’s transportation industry,
60 percent more workers than the Nation’s wholesale
trade industry and its finance and insurance industry,
and nearly as many workers as are those employed in
durable goods manufacturing” (Salamon and Sokolowski
2005, p. 21). In some parts of the country, nonprofits
are among the dominant sectors of the economy. In New
England, for instance, 13% of all private employment is
in nonprofit organizations.
In most cases, nonprofit activity is centered at the
community level, both in terms of the resources avail-
able and the services provided. Smith and Lipsky (1993,
p. 22) describe nonprofits as “manifestations of com-
munity” because they reflect local needs and function
as a central point for assembling diverse community
actors. Studies show that even in a global economy, local
charities continue to be an essential focus for corporate
philanthropy. Guthrie’s (2003) national survey of 2,776
firms’ giving in 2001–2002 found that upwards of 80%
was focused on nonprofits located in the community of
the company’s headquarters, a figure comparable to that
found earlier by Galaskiewicz (1997) and McElroy and
Siegfried (1986). Corporations fund nonprofits directly
through grants, sponsorships, or in-kind donations of
goods or services and indirectly by providing organiz-
ing structures for nonprofit fund-raising, volunteer labor,
special events (e.g., holiday parties for nonprofit clients),
or as a pool for potential board members. Corporate
executives are more likely to be approached by local
(rather than nonlocal) nonprofits, often because they tend
to travel in the same social circles as nonprofit executives
and status benefits are decidedly local. Furthermore, fol-
lowing the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the outsourc-
ing of some of the traditional functions of the welfare
state, nonprofit reliance on local governmental funding
increased (Salamon 1987). Thus, even under globalizing
forces, there are significant pressures that lead corpora-
tions and nonprofits to maintain their local focus.
Interestingly, this prior work suggests a paradox—
that the prevalence of nonprofit organizations is largely
decoupled from any assessment of community needs.
The Twin Cities of Minneapolis–St. Paul have more
performing arts organizations than Detroit not because
of the greater need for culture in Minnesota than in
Michigan but because of the well-organized corporate
infrastructure supporting the arts in the Twin Cities
(Galaskiewicz 1985, Marquis et al. 2007). There is an
analogy here with other sociological literature: social
movement organizations arise not because of the quan-
tity of grievances in a society but because of the orga-
nizing capacity of activists (McCarthy and Zald 1977),
and nation states adopt global practices as a result of
legitimacy pressures and social structure as opposed to
features of the countries (Meyer et al. 1997).
Put another way, the level of underlying “demand” for
nonprofits is only weakly correlated with the existence
of organizations to meet that demand. It is not neces-
sarily the poorest communities that have the most social
welfare organizations but often the richest, because they
are the ones with the resources and organizing capacity
to create such organizations. New York City hosts one
of the world’s greatest art museums, the Metropolitan;
yet within walking distance of the Met are over a dozen
other museums featuring modern and contemporary art,
folk art, African American art, Hispanic art, Catholic
art, Chinese art, Biblical art, art and design, and other
specialties. New York has a very large installed base of
art museums and other nonprofits, yet new ones are cre-
ated at a rate beyond what would be warranted from its
growth in population. Thus, given that community needs
do not seem to fully account for the numbers or types
of nonprofits in a community, we sought to discern the
underlying community mechanisms that might. Under-
standing the differences in types of nonprofits offers a
useful starting point.
Types of Nonprofits: Elite-Oriented
and Social Welfare-Oriented
Tax-exempt status blankets an incredible array of non-
profit types, including religious organizations, research
institutions, art museums, advocacy organizations,
mental health-care providers, golf courses, and pantries
providing food for low-income families. Treating all
nonprofits alike (or as a single homogeneous set) would
be akin to overlooking differences between auto manu-
facturers, banks, and hospitals. Thus, we sought to con-
struct a mid-range typology of nonprofit organizations
that focuses on distinguishing (1) those arts, culture, and
educational nonprofits traditionally associated with elite
interests (e.g., DiMaggio and Anheier 1990, Odendahl
1990) from (2) those focused on issues of social wel-
fare in the community (e.g., Bielefeld and Corbin 1996,
Corbin 1999). Although we recognize a residual third
category that includes a diverse set of nonprofits con-
cerned with business trade and membership associations,
basic research, or the physical environment, it is not as
directly focused on the focal community as the other
two categories, and consequently, it is excluded from our
analysis.
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The key characteristic differentiating our two focal
types of nonprofits is the direct beneficiary of their ser-
vices and activities. We build on the well-established
nonprofit literature in sociology that suggests that
the status structure of elites plays a distinct role in
arts, culture, and education nonprofits. DiMaggio and
Anheier (1990, p. 141) described how the advent of
nonprofit organizations in the late 19th century was
driven by “emerging upper classes eager to control
unruly urban environments and define social bound-
aries” and how participation in the governance of elite
nonprofits through much of the 20th century served
to “promote and maintain upper-class solidarity and
permit elites to monitor and control [nonprofit] poli-
cies.” Abzug (2007, p. 45, citing Odendahl 1990) noted
that “elite nonprofit institutions 0 0 0 [include] the alma
maters, museums, 0 0 0 and other playgrounds of the rich
and famous.”
Drawing from this research, we define elite-oriented
nonprofits as those organizations that focus on the
enrichment of the local cultural environment or the
preservation of elite-oriented values and traditions.
Notably, these are nonprofits that enrich the culture,
higher learning, or prestige of communities and whose
primary, direct beneficiaries are white-collar, college-
educated community residents. By contrast, we define
social welfare nonprofits as those organizations that
address the amelioration of local social problems or
human needs in the community, such as health care,
crime, housing, and other important local social concerns
associated with community well-being. Whereas elite-
oriented nonprofits focus on the enrichment of local cul-
ture or the preservation of elite interests, social welfare
nonprofits “are intended to improve the basic social wel-
fare status of individual lives such that society as a whole
is reformed 0 0 0 [and are a] manifestation of values such as
altruism and generosity” (Corbin 1999, p. 297).3 Focus-
ing on these two types of nonprofits—elite-oriented and
social welfare-oriented—we theorize how their growth
may be linked to the local presence of corporations
and the institutional infrastructure of the communities in
which they operate.
Nonprofit Growth and the Institutional
Infrastructure of Communities
Although early researchers (e.g., Warren 1967, Litwak
and Hylton 1962) recognized the importance of geogra-
phy for organizational behavior, such a view faded until
recently, when researchers came to see geographic loca-
tion as significant in shaping market and organizational
relationships (see Freeman and Audia 2006, Marquis and
Battilana 2009 for reviews). Units of analysis such as
the population or field dominated, as scholars built on
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) to progressively broaden
the definition of field to emphasize geographically inde-
pendent markets or industries. Scott (2001) speculated
that organization theory abandoned community-oriented
studies largely as a result of communication and tech-
nological advances that made geographic connections
appear less relevant.
Yet even as globalization processes have come to gov-
ern practitioner and academic discourse, the effects of
local environments endure (Marquis and Battilana 2009).
For example, in their study of bank foundings, Mar-
quis and Lounsbury et al. (2007) found that community
actors were motivated to maintain localness as a reaction
against more global pressures. Sorge (2005) proposed
that globalizing processes have led local areas to more
clearly delineate their identity. Supporting this, a num-
ber of studies have demonstrated that the prevalence of
corporate practices can vary by city, ranging from taken-
for-granted traditions in corporate governance and strat-
egy (Marquis 2003, Lounsbury 2007) to controversial
strategies such as golden parachutes (Davis and Greve
1997). Thus, even in an age of globalization, organiza-
tions remain tied to local communities.
Like the institutional field, the community bridges
“organizational and societal levels in the study of social
and community change” (DiMaggio 1986, p. 337). Per-
haps the most systematic conceptualization of the impor-
tance of communities was articulated by Warren 40 years
ago (1967). His study of three cities (Philadelphia,
Detroit, and Boston) revealed “the American metropoli-
tan community as a special instance for interorgani-
zational field analysis” (p. 397) and that interaction
among diverse organizational types was fundamental to
the structuration of the community as a field. However,
most recent work on communities as units of analysis
has focused either on particular features conducive to
particular industries, such as the existence of a proximate
base of suppliers for the instruments industry (Audia
et al. 2006) or of universities for biotechnology (Powell
et al. 2005), or on a limited number of communities
(Galaskiewicz 1997, Lounsbury 2007).
Conceiving of the community as an organizational
field, where multisector relationships are worked out
among corporations, nonprofits, governmental, and other
organizations, overcomes a notable limitation of research
on institutional fields. Most work that purports to take
the field as the relevant unit of analysis examines a
single broad industry, such as health care or higher
education, as it evolves over time. Yet some of the
central hypotheses entail a comparative approach that
examines multiple institutional fields simultaneously.
Consider Hypothesis B6 from DiMaggio and Powell
(1983, p. 156): “The greater the extent of structura-
tion of a field, the greater the degree of isomorphics.”
This implies that more densely connected fields will be
more homogeneous than less densely connected fields, a
notion only testable with data across multiple fields that
vary in the density of their networks.
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Our account of the link between corporations and
nonprofits focuses on the importance of organizing
capacity in the community. We hypothesize that the
number of nonprofits in communities will grow to the
extent that (a) local corporate presence and resources are
munificent, (b) corporate leaders and elites are socially
cohesive, and (c) local cultural history and traditions
promote a vibrant nonprofit sector. Moreover, (d) we
argue that the effects of corporate density on elite-
oriented nonprofits will be magnified to the extent that
elites are socially cohesive and embedded in supportive
cultural environments.
Corporate Density in Communities
Locally based corporations are essential constituents of
communities. They are visible symbols of a city’s econ-
omy and provide employment and leadership in the
community. We consider two mechanisms by which a
large population of corporations in the community could
lead to growth in the local population of nonprofits:
directly, through their resource funding and support, and
indirectly, through their ambient presence. Our primary
interest, the direct mechanism of support, includes the
resources corporations provide in the form of financial
donations and personnel support. For instance, corporate
executives are more likely to be approached for dona-
tions by local nonprofits (than nonlocal ones) because
they tend to travel in the same social circles; status ben-
efits from such associations are decidedly local. More-
over, because they are local, corporate investments in
the community are easier to monitor and influence.
Recent and extensive corporate relocations have revealed
this connection. For instance, Chicago’s nonprofit sec-
tor benefited from Boeing’s 2002 headquarters relocation
there. Conversely, in Pittsburgh, “[c]ivic organizations
that lost money and volunteer support on account of
Gulf’s sale include hospitals, colleges, museums and the
world renowned Pittsburgh Symphony” (Hirsch 1987,
p. 68). In addition, even if corporations do not give
directly, their mere presence helps to mobilize the citi-
zenry to the benefit of their community. As noted, cor-
porations serve as aggregators of employee donations
through federated charities such as the United Way.
Recently, over $4 billion was funneled from corporations
to nonprofits in a single year by the local boards of over
1,300 community-based United Ways (Barman 2007).
Furthermore, voluntarism is also most likely to be local.
Corporate managers routinely serve on the boards of
nonprofit organizations, and with few exceptions, these
organizations are a commutable distance from corporate
headquarters.
Indirect mechanisms of support include the spillover
effects corporations provide through local jobs and
wages, which further enhance funding and volunteer
opportunities for nonprofits. Thus, simply having more
corporate headquarters in a community makes for a more
munificent environment for the growth of local nonprof-
its, even if the corporations themselves contribute noth-
ing directly. Corporate headquarters provide relatively
well-paid employment, a nexus for managerial talent,
and a latent recruiting and organizing device. Just as the
existence of a proximate base of suppliers enhances the
prospects for start-ups in the instruments industry (Audia
et al. 2006), and universities provide a fertile soil for
biotechnology firms (Powell et al. 2005), corporations
consequently create a resource base of funds and tal-
ent for nonprofits simply through their presence in the
community.
Theoretically, we acknowledge this second mecha-
nism, but in our empirical tests, we believe that our con-
trol variables account for much of its effect. Thus, the
primary relationship that we propose here is that a dense
population of local corporations in a community will
lead to growth in both local social welfare- and elite-
oriented nonprofits through direct effects of the corpora-
tions such as philanthropic giving, executive leadership,
aggregation of donations, and employee volunteering.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Greater local corporate density
in U.S. communities will lead to growth in both (a) elite-
oriented nonprofits and (b) social welfare-oriented
nonprofits.
Social Infrastructure of Communities
A defining feature of communities and institutional
fields is that their constituents are connected by social
networks that influence the strength and direction of
pressures toward conformity (Laumann et al. 1978).
Putnam (1993) attributed the economic and political
vibrancy of cities and regions in northern Italy—and
their absence in southern Italy—to the networks and
associated norms of their residents. Similarly, commu-
nities with dense networks among their organizations
are particularly effective at promoting high levels of
consistency in support of nonprofits (Marquis et al.
2007). Entrepreneurs can draw on the resources provided
through these networks to build and grow nonprofit ven-
tures to a sustainable size; they are more likely to be suc-
cessful when these resources are more plentiful. Thus,
we propose that nonprofit growth in a community will
be greater when there is a more developed local social
infrastructure, including social networks linking corpo-
rate decision makers, and when there are organizations
facilitating cohesion among community leaders.
Local Network Cohesion. The relational network
linking corporate decision makers has been shown
empirically to encourage high levels of corporate
involvement in nonprofits (Galaskiewicz 1997, Ostrower
2002). There are several reasons for this. First, corpo-
rate donors often direct their resources toward projects
endorsed by their colleagues. This is seen in Columbus,
Marquis, Davis, and Glynn: Corporations, Elites, and Nonprofit Growth in 100 American Communities
44 Organization Science 24(1), pp. 39–57, © 2013 INFORMS
OH, for instance, where many corporations tend to sup-
port the same childrens’ charities, following the lead of
Wendy’s founder Dave Thomas (Marquis et al. 2007).
Second, networks enable mobilization around a common
focus. Regular board meetings create a channel of com-
munication among community business leaders that low-
ers the effort required by institutional entrepreneurs. The
Atlanta Olympics, for instance, was enabled in part by
a combination of dense ties among local business elites,
such as the Coca-Cola Company, and entrepreneurial
efforts by the local utility, Georgia Power (Glynn 2008).
Third, dense networks allow for more effective moral
suasion around philanthropy. The effectiveness of the
Minneapolis–St. Paul “urban grants economy” rests in
part on the fact that the tight-knit local business com-
munity can mobilize social pressure for compliance with
local norms of support for nonprofits (Galaskiewicz
1985). Business leaders concerned with their social
standing may feel required to contribute or face the judg-
ment of their boardroom peers. Conversely, it is easier
to be a free rider in a disconnected community, where
norms are backed by little social sanction. These three
arguments suggest that support for nonprofits will be
greater in more densely connected business communi-
ties. Thus,
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Greater network cohesion among
local corporations will lead to growth in both (a) elite-
oriented nonprofits and (b) social welfare-oriented
nonprofits.
Local Institutions: Upper-Class Social Clubs. The
presence of organizations that connect corporate and
other decision makers within communities can also fos-
ter linkages between the corporate and nonprofit sec-
tors and thus provide a channel for philanthropy. For
instance, Galaskiewicz (1991) highlighted how local
institutions were essential for focusing corporate elite’s
attention on nonprofit support. We highlight the role
of an important local institution for elite cohesion,
the upper-class social club (Domhoff 1967). Extensive
research has suggested the importance of local upper-
class clubs for the social cohesion of communities, par-
ticularly among elite members (Domhoff 1967, Kono
et al. 1998, Marquis 2003). As Kono et al. (1998,
pp. 867–868) noted, these “clubs are foci for elite inter-
action that provide institutionalized informal settings in
which elites are socialized and socially controlled to
adhere to normative business attitudes and behaviors.”
By providing a regular connecting point for elite corpo-
rate decision makers, such clubs allow the ready mobi-
lization of resources in support of the nonprofit sector,
which would lead to growth in nonprofits. Thus, we
hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The presence of an upper-class
club will lead to growth in both (a) elite-oriented non-
profits and (b) social welfare-oriented nonprofits.
Cultural Infrastructure of Communities
In addition to social infrastructure, we propose that the
cultural infrastructure of a community—its history and
traditions—will also influence the growth of nonprofits.
Nonprofits in communities whose cultures draw on long
and focused traditions of philanthropy will be better able
to access resources in support of particular causes and
organizations. We propose that a community’s embed-
dedness in an established regional culture (Hall 1992)
and traditions enduring from the business community’s
founding period (Abzug and Siminoff 2004) may result
in greater growth rates of nonprofits.
Regional Culture. A number of influential studies
across a wide array of disciplines have shown that within
the United States there is significant cultural variation
across regions, suggesting that the prevalence or accept-
ability of organizational action may be geographically
defined. For example, the political contributions of Sun
Belt companies reflect a conservative culture, whereas
companies from the North and Midwest are generally
more politically centrist (Burris 1987). As well, social
psychologists have shown that geography matters:
The North and the South, and the East and the West,
diverge from one another, just as the city does from the
country and the mountains from the coasts. These places
differ not only in their geography or physical space, but
also in their ideological landscape, or collective meaning
space. (Plaut et al. 2002, p. 160)
On a regional level, a number of studies have proposed
significant variation in social and cultural behavior.
Elazar’s (1984) influential studies explaining regional
variations in culture through the historical migratory
patterns of different ethnic and religious groups showed
that there is an individualist culture in the midwest and
western United States, a moralistic and communitarian
culture in New England and the Northern Plains, and a
traditionalistic culture in the South.
With regard to nonprofit support and growth specif-
ically, Hall (1992) distinguished different “cultures of
trusteeship” that influenced the growth trajectory of local
nonprofit sectors. In the central United States, a Mid-
western federationalism emerged, based on the early
example of Cleveland, where many smaller nonprofits
banded together in federations to cooperate and attract
support. In the Northeast, a civil privatism model devel-
oped based on the early example of Boston, where
nonprofits were less organized but individually larger.
Abzug and Siminoff (2004), in their empirical investiga-
tion of the nonprofit sectors of six cities over 60 years,
found support for Hall’s (1992) regional culture theory.
Because we focus on the growth of larger elite-oriented
and social welfare-oriented nonprofits that attract greater
corporate interest, we center our attention on the north-
eastern United States.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Communities in the Northeast
will have greater growth in (a) elite-oriented nonprofits
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and (b) social welfare-oriented nonprofits than commu-
nities in other regions.
Community Tradition. Existing theory and research
suggest that patterns established early in a community’s
history tend to be enduring and to exert a contem-
porary influence. A particularly relevant period is the
early 20th century, a time of substantial social change
as an urban manufacturing-based economy replaced a
rural and agrarian economy. The explosive growth of
manufacturing during this time, coupled with a wave
of finance-driven mergers, created national-scale public
corporations and a new corporate and industrial geog-
raphy in the United States in a relatively brief period.
A number of cities grew to become industrial centers
associated with particular industries—steel in Pittsburgh,
automobiles in Detroit, and tires in Akron, for exam-
ple. Traditions and standards created during this period
continued to have long-lasting effects even decades
later. For instance, Marquis (2003) showed that pat-
terns of corporate governance, such as corporate board
staffing, showed characteristic differences decades later,
as new entrants mimicked the patterns of established
local companies.
In the nonprofit sector, Hall (1987) theorized that
early in the 20th century, the specter of socialism
impelled a closer connection among community actors
(governments, corporations, and nonprofits) that led to a
flowering of nonprofit creation and growth. Many cities
established new forms of philanthropic organization such
as the community foundation or “community chests.” To
the extent that such traditions are enduring, such cities
that established early local cultures encouraging non-
profit support are likely to have greater growth in non-
profits. Thus, we hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). Communities with long-estab-
lished corporate sectors will have greater growth in
(a) elite-oriented nonprofits and (b) social welfare-
oriented nonprofits than communities with corporate
sectors established later.
Growth of Elite-Oriented Nonprofits
We have argued that a community’s nonprofit sector
may gain from the presence of a large corporate popula-
tion and from socially cohesive corporate networks and
well-established cultural traditions of support for phi-
lanthropy. Each of these factors creates resources that
can be drawn on by entrepreneurs to build sustainable
nonprofit organizations. However, we propose that a dis-
proportionate level of resources from the large corporate
sector will be channeled toward elite-oriented nonprofits
(but not social welfare-oriented nonprofits) to the extent
that the corporate sector is well connected and united
by shared cultural norms and traditions. In other words,
we predict that there will be an interaction between the
density of the corporate sector and the elements of the
community’s social and cognitive infrastructure that we
have described such that elite nonprofits will grow to a
greater extent than social welfare nonprofits. In short,
our argument for this relationship has two features. First,
for a variety of reasons, corporate elites may have dis-
proportionate interest in elite nonprofits. Second, they
may be more likely to be able to act on those interests
when they are in locales that provide greater social and
cultural support.
Prior research has shown that elite-oriented nonprofits,
such as those in the arts, culture, and private education,
have long enjoyed the patronage of the wealthy and,
more recently, those in the corporate sector. This sug-
gests that contests for social status, at the level of both
the individual and the organization, have played a cen-
tral part in propelling the growth of such elite-oriented
nonprofits from the Gilded Age in the second half of
the 1800s (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990) to the current
era, in which corporations provide much of the support
for such nonprofits (Odendahl 1990). As Galaskiewicz
et al. (2006, p. 246) summarized, donors particularly
want to be associated with prestigious cultural institu-
tions because “the causes they supported defined their
own social status.” Furthermore, such nonprofits dispro-
portionately raise the local standard of living for the cor-
porate elites because they are more likely to enjoy their
benefits. Thus, although corporations in the Twin Cities
of Minneapolis–St. Paul are lauded for their generous
support of nonprofits, less often noted is the extent to
which their charity is channeled to arts and culture orga-
nizations, and not social welfare groups (Marquis et al.
2007). Because such elite-oriented nonprofits provide a
disproportionate benefit to corporations and their execu-
tives, we believe that their support will be enhanced in
communities with social and cultural infrastructures that
validate this support.
Generally speaking, local social and cultural infras-
tructures enable the spread of information about local
needs and mobilize support across a wide variety of
nonprofit sectors (Galaskiewicz 1997). However, a num-
ber of prior studies have also shown that greater social
and cultural cohesion among elites also sets the stage
for more self-interested action, which partially explains
support of elite-oriented nonprofits. For instance, schol-
ars have shown that states were quicker to pass anti-
takeover laws favored by corporate elites when those
elites were densely connected through common board
memberships (Vogus and Davis 2005). Similarly, polit-
ical contributions by corporations were more alike to
the extent that their executives served on bank boards
together (Mizruchi 1989). We emphasize that in both
cases, action was not a simply a result of the size of
the corporate sector but a combination of the size of the
sector, its social organization, and agreement on com-
mon interests. Thus, in addition to aiding the growth
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of nonprofit sectors generally, we believe that a locally
supportive social infrastructure will positively moderate
the relationship between corporations and elite-oriented
nonprofits.
Furthermore, we also believe that the cultural infras-
tructure will positively interact with corporate density,
resulting in greater gains to elite-oriented nonprofits. As
previously noted, prior research by Hall (1987, 1992)
identifies an interrelated set of regional and historical
processes that led to greater institutionalization of non-
profit support in the Northeast and long-standing com-
munities. Building on this research, Abzug and Simonoff
(2004) showed that nonprofits in the northeastern cities
of Boston and Philadelphia, in particular, had a greater
elite focus than in the midwestern, southern, and western
cities they studied. This suggests that in such locales,
support of elite-oriented nonprofits such as art museums,
symphonies, and private educational institutions may be
more justifiable to local stakeholders.
These interrelated arguments imply that elite-oriented
nonprofits may be more amenable to corporate inter-
ests and that some locales may provide greater insti-
tutional support—whether through social infrastructure
or broader cultural legitimacy—for corporate support of
these nonprofits. This suggests that the existence of a
large corporate sector, combined with dense networks
and supportive cultures, will enhance the growth of elite-
oriented nonprofits relative to other kinds of nonprofits.
Hypothesis 6 (H6). The positive effect of corporate
density on the growth of local elite-oriented nonprofit
organizations will be stronger in communities with
social infrastructures characterized by (a) more cohesive
elite networks and (b) upper-class social clubs.
Hypothesis 7 (H7). The positive effect of corporate
density on the growth of local elite-oriented nonprofit
organizations will be stronger in communities with cul-
tural infrastructures characterized by (a) a location
in the Northeast and (b) long-established corporate
sectors.
Data and Methods
Unit of Analysis and Sample
Our concept of community implies a significant pop-
ulation center within a relatively compact geographic
area—in essence, a commutable distance. We opera-
tionalize community by using the Office of Management
and Budget’s Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs).4
The U.S. Census Bureau (2007) defines a CBSA as
a “core area containing a large population nucleus,
together with adjacent communities having a high degree
of economic and social integration with that core.” For
example, the Chicago CBSA includes Cook County as
well as eight other counties that surround it, thereby cap-
turing companies headquartered in the greater Chicago
area (e.g., Sears in Hoffman Estates, Abbott Laborato-
ries in Abbott Park). Because our theory and hypotheses
relate to the density of corporations and, in particular,
the degree of connection among their elites, we sampled
all U.S. communities above a minimum threshold of cor-
porate density. We include 100 communities with more
than five locally headquartered public corporations in
1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. “Public corporations” were
those traded on either the New York Stock Exchange or
the NASDAQ National Market and that were covered by
Compact Disclosure, a sampling frame that ranged from
4,000 to 6,100 companies over the course of our sample
period.
Dependent Variables
To operationalize our two dependent variables—
elite-oriented nonprofits and social-welfare oriented
nonprofits—we collected data on 501(c)(3) operating
nonprofits from the National Center for Charitable
Statistics (NCCS) at the Urban Institute. The NCCS
compiles data from annual filings of IRS Form 990 for
all nonprofits above a threshold of $10 million in assets
(increased to $30 million after 2001)5 and creates a
database known as the Statistics of Income (SOI). These
data identify the headquarters of given nonprofits that
we use to aggregate based on CBSAs matching the pro-
cedure described above for corporate headquarters. The
number of organizations covered in the database grew
from about 6,000 in 1987 to roughly 10,000 in 2003.
Contemporaneous measures of the size of the nonprofit
population are likely to reflect a number of unobserved
factors. To address this, our modeling procedure (dis-
cussed in more detail below) assesses the growth in the
number of elite-oriented and social welfare nonprofits to
best capture the effects of our hypothesized variables.
For each panel, we collected data on organizations for
both the focal panel year and the subsequent year to
track year-upon-year growth. For instance, for the 2002
panel, we collected separate counts of 2002 organiza-
tions and 2003 organizations.
The NCCS SOI data are widely regarded as the gold
standard in the study of nonprofits (Boris and Steuerle
2006). They do, however, introduce a potential for bias
because they exclude organizations below a minimum
size threshold, creating a conservative measure of the
magnitude of the nonprofit population in a given com-
munity. It is undoubtedly true that nonprofits are under-
counted by the NCCS: there were roughly 200,000
tax-exempt organizations with paid employees in 2002
(Salamon and Sokolowski 2005) and many times that
number of registered nonprofits with minimal operations
and no paid employees, because it is relatively simple
as a legal matter to register a nonprofit organization. Fil-
ing the paperwork to create a nonprofit is a low hurdle,
analogous to creating a corporation (which can easily
be done online with a credit card). So by imposing a
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minimum size cutoff, we ensure that we are counting
organizations with nontrivial operations that are likely
to have the most significant impact on their commu-
nities. Moreover, the $10 million threshold is actually
quite modest; for comparison purposes, in every year our
sampling frame included far more nonprofits than corpo-
rations. Furthermore, we believe that it is consequential
that the NCCS, the primary data source on the nonprofit
industry, uses this value as a cutoff when creating its
database and distributing data.6
To capture distinctions among the different types of
nonprofits on which we focus, we draw on the typology
developed by the Urban Institute—The National Tax-
onomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE). The NTEE system
divides nonprofits into 26 major categories with over 300
subcategories. For each of these categories and subcate-
gories, we classified the nonprofit type as elite-oriented,
social welfare-oriented, or other. Elite-oriented nonprof-
its include the categories of arts, culture and humani-
ties, and philanthropy as well as recreation and sports
subcategories that would benefit the elite such as golf,
equestrian, and major sporting events such as organi-
zations hosting the Olympics (Glynn 2008). For exam-
ple, in Boston these types of elite nonprofits include
organizations such as the Boston Ballet and Milton
Academy. Social welfare-oriented (social welfare, for
short) nonprofits include the categories of mental health,
employment, housing, health care, public safety, youth
development, human services, civil rights, public bene-
fit, food and nutrition subcategories that relate to pro-
viding meals for homeless or homebound populations,
and recreation and community improvement subcate-
gories that are broadly oriented. For example, in Boston
these types of nonprofits include organizations such as
local hospitals (UMass Memorial HealthCare), transition
homes for the abused (Bridge Over Troubled Waters),
vocational training centers (Vocational Adjustment Cen-
ter), elder care organizations (Elder Housing), and many
other organizations that focus on community needs. The
residual category, other, includes a variety of nonprof-
its focused on scientific, professional, or other issues
that are not directed specifically to the local community.
For example, in Boston this includes medical research
(Foundation for Neurological Diseases), international
affairs (Oxfam-America), environmental (National Reli-
gious Partnership for the Environment), and other similar
types of organizations. Although the “other” nonprofits
are not included in main analyses that test the hypothe-
ses, we did conduct supplementary analysis including
these. This supplementary analysis is discussed in the
Results section.
Independent Variables
Corporate Density. Our sampling frame included all
U.S.-based corporations listed on the two major U.S.
stock markets, the New York Stock Exchange and NAS-
DAQ, and which were covered by disclosure in each of
our four panel years. This included over 4,000 compa-
nies in 1987 and 1992, over 6,000 in 1997, and over
4,800 in 2002. For each corporation, we assembled data
on headquarters location, industry, sales and other finan-
cial measures, employment, a variety of financial mea-
sures, and the composition of the board of directors. We
measured corporate density (see H1) as the count of cor-
porations that are headquartered in a CBSA in a given
year (logged to correct for a skewed distribution).7
Social Infrastructure. To calculate network measures
of local corporate cohesion, we constructed network data
sets based on shared directors among the boards of all
firms in our corporate sampling frame for each panel
year (see Mizruchi 1996 for a review). We used exten-
sive computerized and manual data cleaning procedures
to ensure consistency and accuracy in coverage across
boards and over time, which yielded a master data set
that includes a total of 152,466 director-year observa-
tions across our four panel years. Our measure of local
network cohesion (see H2 and H6a) was mean local
degree—that is, the average number of network ties each
firm in a CBSA maintained with other firms in its CBSA.
This number is high to the extent that local compa-
nies recruit directors that also serve on the boards of
other local companies. Extensive prior research shows
that shared directors are an important mechanism for
the spread of information among corporate boards and
for the enforcement of local norms (Mizruchi 1996,
Marquis, 2003).8 We used the upper-class club (see H3
and H6b) list established by Domhoff (1967; see Kono
et al. 1998, note 2, for Domhoff’s process) to determine
the presence of upper-class clubs in each CBSA.
Cultural Infrastructure. We include a dummy vari-
able to assess a community’s regional culture (see H4
and H7a), indicating whether the region is the North-
east, consistent with other researchers who have studied
effects of regional culture on the nonprofit sector (Elazar
1984, Hall 1992, Abzug and Simonoff 2004). Follow-
ing Marquis (2003), we measure the early establishment
of the business community (see H5 and H7b) using the
number of incorporated firms in each city in 1905 from
the Census of Manufactures (U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus 1906). Because of extreme values, this variable was
logged.
Control Variables
We include in the models a number of governmental,
political, socioeconomic, and demographic variables that
could also affect nonprofit growth. Regarding govern-
mental and political factors, a number of studies have
suggested that city governments may coalesce corpo-
rate interests around key needs or issues (Marquis et al.
2007). During our sample period, following changes by
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the Reagan administration, governments became more
proactive in “buying” versus “making” social and wel-
fare services, which led to a governmental outsourcing
trend that directly influenced the growth of nonprofits
(Salamon 1987, Bielefeld and Corbin 1996). As control
variables, we include a number of variables to account
for these processes. We operationalize the size of gov-
ernment as total governmental revenue for each of our
CBSAs, collected from the Census of Governments,
which is taken every five years in years ending in 2
and 7. We include an indicator of whether our city was a
capital city. For each of our city-years, we also include
whether there is Republican leadership to capture the
ideology of local political leaders that are making the
key local social service provisions.
Another major perspective on nonprofit growth is that
they arise out of need. For instance, higher levels of
poverty might prompt the creation of nonprofit edu-
cational or health-care services for low-income clients
(Weisbrod 1998). To account for this, we gathered data
on the economic well-being of the communities and their
residents. From the U.S. Census, we gathered data on
local income levels (wages per job); income growth,
which we calculated as the percentage change in local
income in the previous five years; and total population
to capture the level of economic well-being and overall
size of the community. Because a number of our theo-
ries focus on historical factors in cities and because such
processes are connected to the development of the manu-
facturing centers in the United States, we include a vari-
able that measures the percent manufacturing—that is,
the proportion of locally headquartered firms in Standard
Industrial Classification groups 2 and 3. Another impor-
tant consideration is the degree to which corporations’
business operations are focused locally or more broadly.
To tap the degree to which corporations in a community
are globally oriented, we calculated the average percent-
age of global sales, i.e., sales outside the United States
for locally headquartered businesses. These data were
gathered from the Compustat geographic segment data
as compiled by the Wharton Research Data Service.
Models
We test our hypotheses with a lagged panel design to
assess changes in our dependent variables using ran-
dom effects regression to control for the fact that we
have multiple observations per community. We have four
panels of data for all of our independent variables in
1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. Because we are inter-
ested in assessing change in our dependent variables, we
include dependent variables from period t + 1 (Kessler
and Greenberg 1981). For example, the structure of the
model for elite-oriented nonprofits is as follows:
4Elite-oriented nonprofits5t+1
= B0 + 4Elite-oriented nonprofits5t
+ 4Corporate density5t
+ 4Corporate density ∗ Network cohesion5t
+ · · · + 4Controls5t +U0
As the equation illustrates, when the 2002 values are
the independent variables, the dependent variables are
2003 values. In these models, because the equation is
effectively measuring the change in the dependent vari-
able from t to t+ 1, the independent variables are inter-
preted as predictors of change in the dependent variable.
Results
Table 1 presents the correlations and descriptive statistics
for variables in all of our models. Because there are
high correlations between some of our variables, we ran
diagnostics to ensure that our results are not affected
by multicollinearity. The mean variance inflation factor
(VIF) across all of our models is well below 10, the
suggested threshold point; thus, multicollinearity appears
not to be a serious threat.
We present tests of our hypotheses in Tables 2 and 3,
which model the effects of the hypothesized variables on
the two dependent variables of elite-oriented and social
welfare-oriented nonprofits, respectively. Each table has
11 models, with the first 6 models in each table focusing
on the main effect predictions and the second 5 mod-
els addressing the interaction effects. Models 1–5 are
mainly informational, showing the effects of each pre-
dicted variable with only the control variables. Model 6
presents full models with all main effects, upon which
we will base our conclusions for Hypotheses 1–5. Mod-
els 7–10 present models with the interaction effects that
we hypothesize in H6 and H7; Model 11 is a full model
with all variables. In interpreting the significance of the
interaction effects, we draw on both the full and reduced
models.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that having a greater density
of locally headquartered firms would lead to growth in
both social welfare-oriented and elite-oriented nonprof-
its. Model 6 in Tables 2 and 3 supports this prediction.
The coefficients in these models are highly signifi-
cant and thus provide support for hypotheses concern-
ing both elite-oriented (H1a) and social welfare-oriented
(H1b) nonprofits. Thus, communities with more corpo-
rate headquarters not only have more local nonprofits
at any given time but also see greater growth in the
number of local nonprofits over time. This is consistent
with the idea that local corporations provide ambient
resources for nonprofit entrepreneurs. Although we ear-
lier acknowledged both direct and indirect mechanisms
connecting corporate density with nonprofit growth, our
control variables, such as local income and income
growth, mostly account for these indirect processes.
Thus, these results lead us to conclude that corporate
presence directly leads to growth in a diverse array of
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nonprofits, even net of many other political, social, and
economic features of cities.
The social infrastructure factors we predicted in
Hypotheses 2 and 3 do not find strong support. Although
both of these variables were statistically significant pre-
dictors of both types of nonprofits in the reduced models
(models 2 and 3 in Tables 2 and 3), neither was statis-
tically significant when entered with the full contingent
of independent variables. Hypotheses 4 and 5, regarding
the cultural processes, however, were strongly supported
across both types of nonprofits, suggesting that commu-
nities in the northeastern United States and communities
with an early business establishment experienced higher
nonprofit growth rates than others. These findings imply
that communities with long-established business com-
munities, and particularly those with cultural traditions
of support for the nonprofit sector, provide more fertile
soil for nonprofit entrepreneurs than younger communi-
ties lacking in such traditions.
To uncover some of the moderating effects of local
social and cultural infrastructure on the growth of elite-
oriented nonprofits, we tested the series of interaction
effects predicted in Hypotheses 6 and 7. Models 7–11
in Table 2 present the results. Although Hypothesis 6a
predicting a moderating effect for networks was not
supported, we do find support for Hypotheses 6b, 7a,
and 7b; that is, the growth of elite-oriented nonprof-
its is greater to the extent that corporate density is
accompanied by the presence of upper-class clubs (6b),
a location in the Northeast (7a), and a long-established
local business community (7b). For comparison pur-
poses, in Table 3 we present models that show the inter-
active effects of these same independent variables on the
growth of social welfare-oriented nonprofits. Unlike the
elite-oriented nonprofits, none of the interactions is sta-
tistically significant. In combination, these results pro-
vide evidence that a well-organized and well-established
business community with strong cultural norms is par-
ticularly advantageous for the growth of elite-oriented
nonprofits, whereas it provides little incremental advan-
tage for social welfare nonprofits.
We also conducted a series of robustness checks
(available from the authors upon request) to provide
additional support for our hypothesized mechanisms and
to rule out alternative explanations. First, we conducted
two different sets of analyses where we specified key
independent variables differently. One approach imple-
mented our models examining just the total level of non-
profits as opposed to a change model when we include
a lagged dependent variable. Results not including the
lagged dependent variable were quite similar to those
presented here. In addition, because our focus is on
local nonprofits, we ran our analyses excluding Washing-
ton D.C. and New York, the U.S. headquarters of most
international nonprofits, to make sure those observations
were not unduly biasing our results. These results were
again quite similar to what we report.
A key feature of our approach was unpacking how
corporations influence different types of nonprofit orga-
nizations: elite-oriented, social welfare-oriented, and
other. However, one concern may be that we have inad-
vertently identified processes that would influence all
types of organizations, not just the types of nonprofits
that we identify. To investigate this possibility, we ran
analogous models using as our dependent variable the
residual category “other nonprofits,” which tend to ben-
efit industry-specific, national, or global concerns rather
than the local community. In these analyses (available
from the authors upon request), none of the hypothe-
sized variables found to be significant in the models we
present (see Tables 2 and 3) significantly affect these
“other” nonprofits. We are heartened by this nonsignif-
icant result and take this as evidence that our cate-
gorization of nonprofit types and theorization of their
influences have usefully identified important nonprofit
dimensions and, in particular, the processes by which
corporations and communities’ institutional infrastruc-
ture affect the local nonprofit sector.
A final robustness check uses fixed effects to model
the influence of time-varying characteristics of commu-
nities on nonprofit growth to determine whether our
Table 4 Fixed Effects Models Predicting Local Elite-Oriented
and Social Welfare-Oriented Nonprofits
Social
Elite-oriented welfare-oriented
Corporate density 001553∗∗ 001444∗∗
40004705 40004305
Local network cohesion 000114 000217
40002305 40002105
Total governmental revenue −001617∗ −002240∗∗
40007405 40006705
Republican leadership 00034 000156
40003405 40003105
%Manufacturing 00054 001502
40011405 40010305
Wages/Jobs 000111∗ 00004
40000505 40000505
Income growth 007548∗ 000718
40026505 40024005
Global sales 000025 000002
40000205 40000205
Total population 001481 003096∗
40013905 40012605
Constant 20232 109721
4200885 4108905
Observations 400 400
No. of communities 100 100
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
+p < 001; ∗p < 0005; ∗∗p < 0001 (one-tailed for hypothesized, two-
tailed for controls).
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results could have been influenced by unobserved het-
erogeneity between communities. A limitation, how-
ever, is that a fixed effects approach does not allow
for investigating the influence of factors such as
regional location or early establishment that vary across
but not within communities over time. Because fixed
effects models implicitly control for all time-invariant
differences (including unobserved ones) between com-
munities, these models show how changes in the inde-
pendent variables within a given community lead to
changes in the dependent variables in that community.
Thus, it allows us to more rigorously document a key
mechanism we propose, that as the number of corpora-
tions in a community grows so too does the nonprofit
sector. We present these analyses in Table 4. Although
we are unable to include many of our hypothesized
factors that are fixed community characteristics (i.e.,
regional location, upper-class club, and early establish-
ment), the results show that changes in corporate density
in a community influence changes in both elite-oriented
and social welfare-oriented nonprofits in communities.
Discussion and Conclusions
A classic debate in organization theory has centered on
the question, “What are the consequences of the exis-
tence of organizations?” (Hinings and Greenwood 2002,
p. 411). This theme was the focus of early theorists such
as Weber (1964) and Michels (1962), who sought to
understand how the rise of large organizations shaped
social relations and society more generally. This stream
of research has largely disappeared, perhaps because,
as Stern and Barley (1996, p. 152) suggested, “Larger
issues [of societal consequences] are not only difficult
to address, but 0 0 0 exploring them leads one astray from
developing organizational theory.” We believe that a
major contribution of our research is to reintroduce the
study of broader social issues back into organizational
theory.
We studied how locally headquartered corporations
influenced the growth of two different types of non-
profit organizations—those oriented to the elite and
those focused more broadly on social welfare—in the
100 largest U.S. communities from 1987 to 2002. Our
results show a consistent pattern in the effects of a
number of community-level factors—corporate density,
regional location, and historical factors—on the growth
of both types of community nonprofits. Moreover, we
found that the presence of supportive social and cul-
tural infrastructure significantly moderated the effects
of corporate density on elite-oriented nonprofits but not
on social welfare-oriented nonprofits. In other words,
businesses are good for nonprofits, but they are espe-
cially good for nonprofits that directly benefit the cor-
porate elite. Below we discuss this study’s contributions
to understanding communities as institutional fields and
the role of the corporation in society.
Communities as Institutional Fields
Recent work in organization theory has seen a grow-
ing theoretical tension between studies that emphasize
universalizing tendencies that transcend place and those
that emphasize the critical influence of local geography
on organizational behavior (Marquis and Battilana 2009,
Marquis et al. 2011). On the one hand, modern trans-
portation and communication systems seem to render
geographical boundaries increasingly irrelevant, as orga-
nizational fields partake of global processes that spread
homogeneity around the world (Scott 2001). On the
other hand, geographic communities determine access
to resources for organizational creation (Audia et al.
2006), shape the dynamics of competition for labor and
consumers (Sorenson and Audia 2000), influence deci-
sions such as whether to downsize (Greenwood et al.
2010), and provide norms of strategy (Lounsbury 2007)
and governance (Marquis 2003). Thus, despite the trend
showing evolution from particularism to universalism
(e.g., Warren 1967, Robertson and Khondker 1998,
Sorge 2005), the idiosyncrasies of community continue
to shape organizational behavior in critical ways, from
the norms and networks that promote industrial rein-
vention in Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1994) to the urban
amenities and diversity that attract the creative class and
its employers (Florida 2002).
We propose that a way to conceptually unpack this
tension is to conceive of communities as institutional
fields, which highlights the multisectoral processes and
interactions we demonstrate. That is, community is not
just about the spatial bounds of markets, the proxim-
ity of corporate actors, or where political boundaries
are defined. Rather, community entails important social
and cultural factors shaping organizational behavior. The
means by which communities have their effects can be
dimensionalized in terms of their character as fields, i.e.,
the nature of their social and organizational infrastruc-
ture and cultural-cognitive understandings. Prior stud-
ies of nonprofits have often examined specific cities
(e.g., Minneapolis, Atlanta) or types of nonprofits such
as arts (DiMaggio 1991) or health services (Bielefeld
and Corbin 1996). Similarly, prior studies of geography-
independent fields have often been, in effect, case studies
of environmentalism (Hoffman 1999), biotechnology
(Powell et al. 2005), or health care (Scott et al. 2000).
By combining these approaches, we show that the effect
of these community pressures is to focus the atten-
tion of organizational actors locally even as business
expands globally, with consequences for the growth of
two important types of nonprofits.
Recognizing the geographic community as an
organizational field overcomes one of the prominent lim-
itations of institutional research, that of focusing on
a single industry or sector. As DiMaggio and Powell
(1983, p. 148) initially conceptualized the organizational
field—“as a recognized area of institutional life”—they
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pointed out that the “virtue in this unit of analysis
[is] 0 0 0 that it directs our attention not simply to com-
peting firms…or to networks of organizations that actu-
ally interact 0 0 0but to the totality of relevant actors”
(emphasis added). By focusing on the level of the local
community, we expanded the set of field actors to
include for-profits, nonprofits, and other organizations,
thus revealing both the direct and indirect effects of their
membership in this field, as well as allowing a compar-
ative approach across multiple communities.
Our more general contributions to institutional theory
include showing how historical forces and the legacy
of elite interactions continue to shape not only social
outcomes but also interorganizational interactions within
community fields. To a surprising extent, the historical
circumstances of a city’s growth had lingering effects
on its present-day community dynamics. For both types
of nonprofits, early established cities were more likely
to have nonprofit growth. Consistent with Hall (1987)
and Marquis (2003), we speculate that the norms of
civic engagement established by business leaders in
the early period of large-scale industrialization cast a
long shadow. This enduring legacy may provide some
solace to well-established communities that lose busi-
ness; norms of civic engagement seem to run deep in
spite of such exits. For instance, although Boston lost
three of its largest headquartered firms early in the
2000s (Gillette, FleetBoston, and John Hancock), early
reports suggest that nonprofit giving had not declined
(Talcott 2005). The process of how such traditions
endure is described in an article on corporate giving in
Minneapolis:
When a new chief executive came to town, other chief
executives would sit him down and explain how things
were done in the Twin Cities. In 1988 when the British
firm Grand Metropolitan bought Pillsbury in a $5 billion
hostile takeover, people worried that raiders from over-
seas would cut back on the company’s giving, which was
at the 2 percent level. Instead, the city’s corporate leaders
met with the Grand Met representatives 0 0 0 and explained
what 0 0 0 (our) culture was. (Nocera 2007)
As a result, Pillsbury maintained its 2% giving.
The Corporation and Social Outcomes
Our results indicate that future research on how orga-
nizations affect society can gain traction by examin-
ing processes at the community level. We found that
communities that had a large population of corporate
headquarters saw enhanced growth of both types of non-
profit organizations, but we anticipate that corporations
can have a broad spectrum of influences on their local
communities.
At a more practical level, we also contribute to under-
standing how and where nonprofit organizations grow.
Given that this sector employs almost 10% of the U.S.
workforce, it is surprising that it does not attract more
research attention from organizational theorists. Our
results on the prevalence of corporate headquarters in
U.S. cities significantly promoting the overall vitality
of key nonprofit sectors can provide some guidance to
community leaders. Whereas prior research has impli-
cated generational changes and individuals choices in
civil society changes (Putnam 2000), our results sug-
gest that individuals’ choices are made against a set of
constraints shaped by the society and economy around
them. Even in a postindustrial economy with extensive
globalization, local community still matters: companies
support social welfare and elite-oriented nonprofits clos-
est to home. Chicago’s concerted effort to attract Boe-
ing, with its promise of only 500 additional jobs, thus
appears prescient, as our analyses suggest that the strat-
egy of attracting corporate headquarters may make sense
for communities as many important spillovers to com-
munity nonprofits would ensue.
However, by specifically identifying the elite nature
of some nonprofits, our findings also seem to war-
rant a potentially skeptical stance with regard to cor-
porate support of nonprofits in the United States. As
our interaction effects showed, the impact of corporate
density was magnified in cities with an elite charac-
terized by cohesive social organization and supportive
cultural features—but only in the case of elite-oriented
nonprofits, i.e., those focused on arts, culture, and pri-
vate education. Social welfare-oriented organizations, in
contrast, saw no such additional benefit. Our results are
thus generally consistent with speculation in the large
extant literature on nonprofits indicating that philan-
thropy may actually be a vehicle to benefit elite inter-
ests (e.g., Ostrander 1984, DiMaggio and Anheier 1990,
Ostrower 1995). We go beyond this prior work, looking
across a large number of communities and demonstrat-
ing that corporate effects on elite-oriented nonprofits are
enhanced to the extent that there is a community infras-
tructure that seems to organize and validate the elite.
Thus, we add an important caveat to prevailing wisdom:
corporations may be prone to “responsibility with a pay-
off,” but this is realized primarily when infrastructure
for collective coordination and mobilization is in place.
At a more general level, these findings suggest that even
within institutional fields with strong centripetal forces,
different kinds of actors can be disproportionally influen-
tial when supporting social and cultural structures exist.
In conclusion, these results provide a nuanced pic-
ture of interorganizational, multisector dynamics at the
community level, and they suggest that there is a subtle
interplay among corporate headquarters and mediating
social and cultural institutions for elite cohesion wor-
thy of further investigation. Local organizations, soci-
ety, culture, and government are closely interrelated in
dynamic fields; our findings reinforce this and intimate
the usefulness of studying their interaction. We believe
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that if organizational scholars are to shift their con-
cerns to larger societal issues, focusing more explicitly
on how corporations affect society (Hinings and Green-
wood 2002), our results indicate that the community is
an appropriate and useful site for doing so. The vibrancy
of nonprofits within a community represents one of the
most direct indicators of the quality of life in that com-
munity, from the availability of education and the arts to
the nature of the social safety net. The findings reported
here document that the local organizational field—its
size, its composition, and the ways its constituents inter-
act within a community—is perhaps the most proximate
factor behind the vibrancy of the nonprofit sector. Thus,
there are both relatively straight as well as winding paths
leading from organizations to quality of life within com-
munities, and these different paths merit further study.
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Endnotes
1Defined as Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs), which we
discuss in the Data and Methods section.
2These years were chosen to match the U.S. Economic Census
surveys, which provide several of our independent variables—
see http://www.census.gov/econ/census02.
3We acknowledge that some nonprofits that provide services to
the poor may nonetheless have a role in maintaining the local
elite in that wealthy residents dominate their boards and ser-
vice on those boards is a mark of recognition and achievement.
4This is a revised system that builds on the prior Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (MSA) system. Our measurement is as of
November 2004 definitions. To make sure all of our variables
account for spatial changes in CBSAs over time, the mea-
surement of all of our variables, even those that extend back
to 1987, is based on this more recent geographic definition.
To accomplish this, for all of our variables, we obtained the
underlying county data and aggregated these to CBSA based
on the November 2004 definitions.
5This discontinuity is unfortunate; however, we feel that it
does not impact or bias our analyses. First, as we discuss,
our panel design focuses on modeling the growth of the local
sectors between t−1 and t. Thus, the discontinuity is between
panels and does not impact the analyses of each specific year
(e.g., the analyses of growth between 2002 and 2003 compares
comparable organizations). Second, we conducted numerous
robustness checks, such as running the data without the latest
panel and inserting dummy variables—none of which altered
the presented results.
6A second concern is the possibility that the population size
might change because of nonprofits moving above (or below)
the $10 million threshold. In fact, however, across both elite-
oriented and social welfare-nonprofits, we find that over 90%
of organizations that appear in one year also appear in the
following panel. Thus, nearly all the variation in the sample is
due to the addition of new organizations.
7Alternative specifications could include total corporate sales
in a community or total corporate profitability in a community.
We chose to use corporate density for a number of reasons.
First, we believe that it is conceptually consistent with our
focus on growth in nonprofit density and our discussion of the
importance of the changing demography of corporations. For
instance, if one were to focus on sales, this would overem-
phasize cities that have a number of large corporations, e.g.,
Detroit, and obscure the effects of the vibrancy of smaller and
midsize public company growth that we believe are important
processes that relate to nonprofit growth. Results, however, are
very similar to those reported when using total local sales.
Additionally, although there may be a relationship between
corporate profitability and philanthropy (Margolis and Walsh
2003), in fact, most large public companies have corporate
foundations to “smooth giving” and ensure philanthropic sup-
port during periods of low income (Committee Encouraging
Corporate Philanthropy 2008). Thus, without comprehensive
data on corporate foundation assets and spending, we also do
not believe that profitability is an apt measure.
8We also calculated a number of other network measures for
each CBSA-level network, including density, centralization,
mean clustering coefficient, and the external–internal index,
but we found that our simple “mean degree” measure was
both parsimonious and highly correlated with the other net-
work measures.
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